



LOUISIANA LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR
DARYL G. PURPERA, CPA, CFE

Department of Corrections

LLA Audit-Related Issues

- 1. Accuracy of Offender Data – October 2017 (see Attachment A for Report Highlights)**
 - Data in CAJUN, which is DOC's primary mechanism for tracking offenders, is not always accurate. This results in difficulties knowing where offenders are being held.
 - In addition, DOC's process for calculating offender release dates is inconsistent. Our office has received many complaints that the sentences/release dates are not being calculated correctly.
- 2. Oversight of Trusty Programs – December 2016 (see Attachment B for Report Highlights)**
 - Correctional facilities are not fully complying with trusty regulations. As a result, some trustees are not eligible which can impact public safety.
- 3. Oversight of Transitional Work Programs – April 2016 (Attachment C for Report Highlights)**
 - Oversight needs to be strengthened. DOC does not know where all offenders are located on a daily basis. In addition, procedures need to be strengthened to ensure participating offenders are supervised at all times.
- 4. Fraud-Related Issues (Attachment D for Report Highlights)**
 - Misappropriations within Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola (January 2017)
 - Concession sales misappropriation within Avoyelles Correctional Facility (August 2016)



DARYL G. PURPERA,
CPA, CFE

Report Highlights

Management of Offender Data: Processes for Ensuring Accuracy

Department of Corrections

Audit Control # 40160023

Performance Audit Services • October 2017

Why We Conducted This Audit

We conducted this audit to evaluate the Department of Corrections's (DOC) management of offender data, including its processes for ensuring the accuracy of that data. More than half of Louisiana's approximately 35,000 inmates are housed in parish facilities and work release centers, with the remaining housed in the state's nine correctional facilities. Because offenders are housed all across the state, it is important for DOC management to have centralized, accurate, and up-to-date information on all the offenders under its supervision.

What We Found

Overall, we found that DOC needs to implement or strengthen existing policies and procedures to more effectively manage offender data, including better tracking of offender locations and a consistent method of calculating release dates. In addition, data stored in the Criminal and Justice Unified Network system (CAJUN), which is DOC's primary mechanism for tracking state offenders, is not always accurate, which can limit DOC's and stakeholders' decision-making abilities. We identified the following issues:

- **Offender locations are not always accurate in CAJUN, particularly for offenders housed in local facilities, because DOC policy does not include a timeframe for when local facilities must notify DOC of a transfer to another local facility.** We reviewed 100 files and found 11 (11%) offenders who were at a facility other than what was in CAJUN. Of these 11 offenders, four (36.4%) were violent offenders.
- **DOC's procedures for monitoring offender data entry, especially for offenders in local facilities, are not sufficient to identify all data errors.** DOC does not include offenders housed in local facilities in its quality assurance audits. We sampled 100 offender files at nine local facilities and one state facility and found that 19% of offender files had at least one error in CAJUN.
- **DOC's process for calculating offender release dates is inconsistent, which can result in errors.** DOC does not have any policies, procedures, manuals, or standardized guidance that outlines the correct way to calculate release dates. This leads to inconsistent calculation methods.
- **Former DOC employees still have access to CAJUN and have the ability to change data.** We found that 38% of CAJUN user IDs were assigned to former DOC employees, which poses a risk to the security of CAJUN data. Without proper revocation procedures, there is a risk that former DOC employees may be able to make unauthorized changes to offender data. Of the 216 Office of Adult Services user IDs that permit changes to offender data, 83 (38%) did not match any current employees.
- **DOC spent \$3.6 million on a new data system that was supposed to have allowed for better tracking of offenders. However, the system failed due to inadequate planning and testing.** The OMS went live on June 15, 2015, and it was taken off-line on July 31, 2015, due to system failures.



DARYL G. PURPERA,
CPA, CFE

Report Highlights

Oversight of Trusty Programs

Department of Public Safety and Corrections

Audit Control # 40150030

Performance Audit Services • December 2016

Why We Conducted This Audit

We conducted this audit to evaluate the Department of Public Safety and Corrections' (DPSC) oversight of trusty programs at state correctional institutions (Department of Corrections - DOC) and the Louisiana State Police (LSP) Barracks. Trustees are offenders classified as minimum security who are assigned to one of three levels, with Level 1 being the least restrictive and Level 3 being the most. Trustees are given privileges that are not available to the general prison population and provided with a job assignment, depending on their trusty status level.

What We Found

We found that DOC needs to improve its oversight of trusty programs by ensuring that all correctional facilities comply with regulations. We identified the following issues:

- DOC needs to ensure that all correctional facilities comply with its trusty regulations. While some correctional institutions complied with DOC policy for certain trusty levels, none of them fully complied with all requirements. As a result, some trustees were not eligible. Specifically:
 - Because the Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola's trusty policy did not contain eligibility requirements, we found that a total of 1,547 (91%) trustees at Angola were not eligible, according to DOC regulations. Using Angola's new policy that was revised during the audit, we re-analyzed the same list of Angola's trustees using only Level 3 eligibility requirements and found that a total of 400 (24%) out of 1,705 trustees were not eligible. However, all 400 of them were considered by DOC to be eligible due to having an undocumented, implicit waiver for a sex offense or time served less than 10 years.
 - The three other institutions we reviewed [Dixon Correctional Institute (DCI), Elayn Hunt Correctional Center, and Louisiana Correctional Institute for Women] had 47 (5%) trustees who were not eligible. Of the 868 eligible trustees, 100 trustees were considered by DOC to be eligible due to having an undocumented, implicit waiver for a sex offense or time served less than 10 years.
 - DCI's policies allow trustees who are assigned to work in state buildings in Baton Rouge to have less stringent requirements regarding crimes of violence. We found that 14 of 151 (9%) Level 1 trustees at DCI assigned to Baton Rouge state buildings were not eligible. If all 151 of the Baton Rouge trustees had to comply with the same requirements as other Level 1 trustees, 49 (33%) would not be eligible because they had crimes of violence such as aggravated battery, manslaughter, and aggravated assault with a firearm.

Continued on next page

Oversight of Trusty Programs

Department of Public Safety and Corrections

What We Found (Cont.)

- DOC needs to collect centralized and electronic information on trusties, including when and why their trusty status is downgraded or removed due to rule violations. This would help DOC monitor the eligibility of trusties at correctional institutions. We reviewed 318 violations committed by 309 trusties and found that not all trusties had their trusty status reduced or removed due to these violations, including major rule violations. Specifically, we identified 19 trusties (6%) who had the same status level after committing violations ranging from general prohibited behavior and defiance to aggravated sex offense and intoxication.

We also found that LSP needs to establish departmental specific regulations for LSP Barracks trusties, including what eligibility requirements can be waived.

- Staff at the LSP Barracks used their internal inmate screening process for trusties, which differs from LSP's departmental policy. We found that eight of 142 (6%) LSP Barracks trusties were not eligible based on these internal requirements. According to LSP Barracks staff, they waived the drug offense convictions requirement for these offenders because they met other eligibility requirements. However, LSP Barracks' internal screening process does not allow for granting any waivers.



Report Highlights

Transitional Work Program

Department of Public Safety and Corrections

DARYL G. PURPERA,
CPA, CFE

Audit Control # 40140066
Performance Audit Services • April 2016


Why We Conducted This Audit

This report provides the results of our performance audit of the Transitional Work Program (TWP) administered by the Department of Public Safety and Corrections – Corrections Services (Corrections). During fiscal year 2015, approximately 8,700 offenders participated in TWP and Corrections received \$19.8 million from state general funds to oversee the program. The purpose of this audit was to evaluate Corrections' oversight of the TWP and to identify benefits of the program.

What We Found

TWP facilities are administered by either local sheriffs or private companies and monitored by Corrections. As of June 2015, there were 27 providers operating 38 facilities throughout Louisiana. Strong oversight of the TWP is critical as there are public safety risks associated with the offender population and many beneficiaries of the program.

The state benefits by paying a reduced per diem that results in savings of approximately \$12.1 million per year for offenders that participate in TWP, and recidivism rates of offenders who participate in TWP are lower than offenders who do not. Offenders benefit by learning work skills and participating businesses benefit from reduced labor costs. Program providers also receive a benefit as they receive a per diem from the state, which totaled \$15.5 million in calendar year 2015; commissary sales, which totaled \$4.1 million in calendar year 2015; and 64% of offenders' wages for room and board, which totaled \$35.5 million in calendar year 2015. Overall, we found that Corrections needs to strengthen its oversight of TWP in the areas discussed below.



Source: Prepared by legislative auditor's staff using information received from Corrections.

- **Nearly half of TWP slots are not filled. If TWP facilities operated at capacity, the state could save an additional \$7 million a year.** As of June 2015, there were a total of 5,278 approved TWP slots for the 38 TWP facilities. However, 2,015 (38%) of the approved slots were not filled. Although this can be due to offenders choosing not to participate, seasonal employment, or facilities using the beds to house non-TWP offenders, it is also because until recently Corrections did not have a consistent or systematic process for screening state offenders housed in local jails to identify those eligible for TWP.
- **Corrections does not ensure that providers notify it prior to transferring offenders to a different TWP facility or back to a local jail.** As a result, Corrections does not know where all TWP offenders are located on

Continued on next page

Transitional Work Program

Department of Public Safety and Corrections

What We Found (Cont.)

a daily basis. When an offender participating in TWP is either transferred to another TWP or back into regular incarceration, the TWP facility is required by Corrections' *Standard Operating Procedures* to notify the department via fax or email prior to the transfer occurring so they can update the CAJUN system. However, Corrections management does not enforce this policy.

- **Corrections needs to develop additional procedures to ensure that offenders participating in TWP are supervised at all times.** During fiscal years 2013 through 2015, offenders escaped 254 times.
- **Corrections does not ensure that providers deduct restitution and other obligations TWP offenders owe from their wages, as required by law and internal policy.** As a result, providers only deducted .05% (\$19,184 out of \$38.8 million) of total restitution and obligations owed from offenders including \$5 million dollars owed to victims and \$29 million in supervision fees owed to Corrections during calendar year 2015.
- **Corrections does not limit the amount an offender can spend on commissary purchases or cash allowances which limits the offender's ability to accumulate savings and pay other required obligations such as restitution.** During calendar year 2015, offenders spent \$6.4 million on commissary items and cash allowances. The chart below shows all offender deductions for calendar year 2015.

Offender Paycheck Deductions by Type* Calendar Year 2015		
Type	Amount	Percentage
Room and Board	\$35,523,662	78.94%
Commissary (e.g., candy, greeting cards, energy drinks, tobacco, etc.)	4,138,466	9.20
Cash Allowance	2,271,457	5.05
Child Support	726,267	1.61
Family Funds (i.e., money sent to family voluntarily)	1,843,911	4.10
Medical	478,984	1.06
Court-ordered Restitution and other financial obligations	19,184	0.04
Total	\$45,001,931	100%
*This exhibit does not include federal and state taxes, Medicare, or Social Security deducted from offender paychecks.		
**TWP offenders are responsible for paying co-pays for medical visits and prescription medications.		
Source: Prepared by legislative auditor's staff using self-reported data from TWP facilities provided to Corrections in their monthly report.		

- **Although Corrections conducted all required monitoring of TWP providers in 2014 and 2015, we identified weaknesses in its monitoring process.** For example, Corrections does not conduct follow-up visits on critical or repeat findings identified during its monitoring visits.
- **Corrections does not require that TWP providers offer rehabilitation programs that could help reduce recidivism rates.** On average TWP providers offered only three rehabilitation programs compared to local jails, who offered seven, and state institutions, who offered 61 during calendar year 2015.



DARYL G. PURPERA,
CPA, CFE

Report Highlights

Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola - Department of Public Safety and Corrections

Audit Control # 50150042 and 50160016
Investigative Audit Services • January 2017

Why We Conducted This Audit

We began our audit after receiving complaints of improper transactions at the Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola (Angola). During all relevant time, Burl Cain was the Angola warden. We conducted this audit to determine whether there was a factual basis for these allegations.

What We Found

Angola Employees Failed to Take Leave while Working on Warden Cain's Personal Residence

Lodging and Meals Provided to Members of Warden Cain's Family

Angola's Prison Enterprises' Facility Refurbished Iron Gates from Warden Cain's Personal Residence

Public Funds Were Used to Purchase Appliances and Household Furnishings for the Angola Warden's House at Angola without Proper Authority

Revenue from the Angola Rodeo Not Deposited with the State Treasury or Included in the Department of Corrections' Budget

Angola Prison Rodeo Committee Improperly Donated Funds to Purchase Bus

Angola Employee Recreation Committee's (AERC) Use of Angola Assets and Noncompliance with Its By-Laws

Personal Purchases and Cash Withdrawals Made from AERC Fund

AERC Rodeo Concession Sales Revenue Not Deposited

Personal Purchases Made from Angola Hook and Ladder Club Account



DARYL G. PURPERA,
CPA, CFE

Report Highlights

Department of Public Safety and Corrections – Avoyelles Correctional Facility

Audit Control # 50160013

Financial Audit Services • August 2016

Why We Conducted This Audit

In April 2016, the Office of the Louisiana Inspector General requested assistance from the Louisiana Legislative Auditor's (LLA) office with its investigation into the Avoyelles Correctional Facility (AVC). LLA agreed to participate and completed the investigation on a concession sales misappropriation.

What We Found

Cash Deposit Shortage

AVC records indicate that concession sales exceeded amounts deposited into the corresponding AVC bank account by \$31,170 from August 9, 2014 to February 21, 2016. AVC employees told us that former Administrative Program Director Tonia Cain was the only employee to regularly obtain and/or count cash concession collections alone. We were also told that Ms. Cain directed others to alter and destroy public records related to concession sales. By using her position to direct others to alter and destroy public records to conceal discrepancies between recorded concession sales and concession deposits, Ms. Cain may have violated state law.